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Juridical Ontology: The Evolution of Legal Form 
Simon Deakin ∗ 
Abstract: »Juristische Ontologie: Die Evolution der Rechtsform«. Juridical con-
cepts – specialized terms used in legal reasoning – have adaptive properties 
which allow for their coevolution with the social relations that they describe 
and constitute. Concepts form a bridge between empirical facts and legal 
norms. As such they allow data about the social world to enter legal discourse 
and frame normative judgments. Their defeasibility allows them to adjust to 
changes in their social and economic context. Studying juridical concepts in 
their historical context opens up new perspectives on institutional change and 
contributes to our understanding of social reality. 
Keywords: Social ontology, legal evolution, systems theory, conventions, em-
ployment norms. 
1.  Introduction 
Law in action and the norms of law are not two independent spheres  
of existence, but different sides of one and the same reality.  
(Ross 1959, 19). 
Juridical concepts are specialized terms used in legal reasoning. Examples 
include “property,” “contract,” “company” and “employee.” These terms have 
distinctive legal meanings, which are separate from the senses ascribed to them 
in everyday usage and in the social science disciplines. What is their ontologi-
cal status? What did Ross mean when he described “norms of law,” that is law 
in the text, and “law in action,” that is law operating in its social context, as 
complementary aspects of the same “reality” (Ross 1959, 19)? 
This article will argue that juridical concepts should, indeed, be understood 
as part of social reality. They are the product of human minds, and hence de-
pend upon human actors’ subjective perceptions and understandings of the 
social world, but they exist independently of any individual actor’s intention or 
will. As such their objective existence can be verified using procedures which 
are appropriate for validating empirical claims about the social world.  
A second, related, claim is that studying juridical concepts can tell us some-
thing about the social world beyond the juridical realm. In other words, the 
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analysis of legal concepts is not a purely internal legal exercise. Legal language 
and practices are a distinct part of social reality, but they are not unrelated to 
other dimensions of society. Thus studying juridical concepts using the tech-
niques of legal analysis will inform us about the nature of social practices be-
yond the legal text, for example in transactional or organizational contexts. 
Exactly what it tells us, and how, need to be precisely specified. Legal forms do 
not have a one-to-one correspondence with social practices beyond the legal 
system, but they do co-exist with and evolve alongside them. This co-evolution-
ary dynamic can be empirically studied, and the role of law in shaping economic 
and social relations over time brought into the open. 
Section 2 outlines the form of juridical concepts and the function they play, 
within legal reasoning, of linking empirical data from the social world to deon-
tic or normative propositions embedded in legal rules. Section 3 takes a closer 
look at legal evolution and explains how the study of legal concepts in an his-
torical perspective can be used to throw light on social structures beyond the 
text. This involves a consideration of the dual character of the legal system as, 
at one and the same time, separated from society, and embedded in it. Section 4 
illustrates the argument through a case study which looks at the evolution of 
legal concepts relating to the employment relationship in a number of national 
contexts. Section 5 considers the significance of the analysis of legal concepts 
for the resolution of current debates in the theory of social reality.  
2.  Form and Function of Juridical Concepts 
A juridical concept is a linguistic form used for specifying the conditions for 
the application of a legal rule which takes the form “in C, if X than Y,” as in, 
“in the context of a work relationship, if X is an employee, he may not be un-
fairly dismissed.” Several concepts are embedded in the rule: the terms “em-
ployee,” “unfairly” and “dismissed” all have to be unpacked. An “employee” is 
a category of worker, “dismissed” refers to termination of the relationship by 
the employer, and “unfair” refers to the procedural and substantive context of 
that termination. In the contemporary labour law systems of industrial market 
economies these are all terms of art whose meaning depends on interpretation 
of a mass of legal materials including voluminous reports of decided cases and 
extensive statutory texts.  
It might be thought that the concepts themselves add relatively little to the 
content of the rule. The concept “employee” could just be shorthand for saying, 
in a certain context, “if a person agrees to work for another for regular remu-
neration he is entitled to be treated fairly before that other ends their relation-
ship.” The concept is an intermediating link or bridge between a set of factual 
preconditions, on the one hand, and certain normative or deontic conclusions, 
on the other. It can be said to represent or condense a good deal of otherwise 
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unwieldy information, but without adding anything of its own. This was Ross’s 
view: the concept is “inserted between the conditioning facts and the condi-
tioned consequences” solely as “a means of presentation.” It is “in reality a 
meaningless word without any semantic reference whatsoever” (Ross 1957). 
The idea that concepts serve to condense complex information certainly cap-
tures part of their function within legal reasoning. The empirical preconditions 
for the application of the concept “employee” are notoriously complex. The 
English courts, for example, apply a “multi-factor” test under which numerous 
features of working relationships are potentially relevant to employee status, 
without any of them being conclusive: is work regular or intermittent, who 
determines how the work is to be done, who owns the tools or equipment need-
ed to do the work, what form does the remuneration take, who takes the surplus 
from production, and so on. The normative consequences of employee status 
are also complex: the worker’s right to receive the minimum wage, join a trade 
union, access social security benefits, and so on, are all affected by the legal 
classification of the work relationship, as are certain liabilities, for example 
those relating to the incidence of income tax. Various subcategories (“fixed-
term employee”), satellite concepts (“agency worker”) and even a higher-level, 
“genus” form (“worker”) have recently appeared as a response to the weight 
that the idea of the employee has to carry (Deakin and Morris 2012, ch. 3). 
Although this fragmentation and multiplication of concepts gives rise to prob-
lems of its own, it is likely that the law governing employment would be even 
more chaotic and disorganized than it is often claimed to be, if it lacked this 
extensive conceptual infrastructure. Jurists who are critical of the role of the 
contract of employment as the core idea of contemporary labour law systems 
tend to call for its replacement by or evolution into a more useful concept 
(Hepple 1986; Freedland and Kountouris 2011), not for the complete elimina-
tion of conceptual ordering. 
Ross’s point was that, after allowing for the representational effects of con-
cepts, we should not ascribe independent causal powers to them. In particular, 
we should be very cautious to accept that concepts, in themselves, determine 
the content of rules or the conditions for their application. Such caution is un-
doubtedly justified. However, as Giovanni Sartor has argued, Ross’s view is 
excessively reductive. This is for a number for reasons.  
Firstly, concepts acquire inferential meaning from the prior conditions for 
and subsequent effects of their application, but also create meaning by virtue of 
the role they play in integrating empirical and normative data. Thus the defini-
tion of the prior conditions for the application of a rule can never be entirely 
separate from the consequences of applying it: there is “a feedback circle in-
volved in construing legal norms, connecting assignment of a meaning to a 
term and a teleological interpretation of the norms including that term” (Sartor 
2009, 27). Thus the normative context in which a rule is applied is unavoidably 
taken into account when the prior conditions for its application are being con-
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sidered. The factors which determine the personal scope of employment law 
are not derived only from the abstract definition of the term “employee” but 
also from the concrete effects of applying certain legal rights and obligations to 
particular types of work relationship. This often leads to the circular, or at any 
rate, non-linear reasoning which characterizes attempts to define complex legal 
forms: the empirical observation that an employee is a person under the “con-
trol” of another is used to draw the normative conclusion that a person in the 
position of an employee is under a duty to obey the reasonable and lawful 
orders of their employer.  
Secondly, concepts frame the possibilities of legal interpretation by virtue of 
the taxonomical order in which they are arranged (Sartor 2009, 19). Concepts 
are linked to each other through subdivision and fragmentation, with subcate-
gories and satellites expressing exceptions from or variations of originating or 
“foundational” terms. Conceptual meanings are derived at least in part from the 
positions of particular terms within the overall taxonomical order. For example, 
it is possible to refer back to a more foundational concept if the conditions for 
the application of a rule cannot be satisfactorily identified at the more concrete 
level of a subcategory. Thus the category “employment” is itself a subcategory 
of the term “contract,” which in turn refers back to an even more foundational 
concept, “person.” Because of this derivation, principles derived, remotely, 
from the law of persons, and, somewhat more proximately, the law of contract 
flow into employment law, while decisions on employment cases flow back in 
the opposite direction, influencing the “general part” of the law of contractual 
obligations. The process is not necessarily deliberate or even conscious at the 
level of individual legal acts, such as the publication of a ruling or the formula-
tion of a statutory formula; it becomes visible over the course of time and in 
respect of a sufficiently large sample of juridical texts. The effects are mixed. 
In some contexts, contract law, with its emphasis on the autonomy of the par-
ties, has been used to frustrate the application of protective labour standards; in 
others, the regulatory influence of labour legislation has infiltrated the contrac-
tual core of the employment relationship, stimulating the development of new 
norms of mutual trust and confidence. 
Thirdly, concepts assist the process of legal interpretation through their 
open-endedness or “defeasibility” (Sartor 2009, 28). Concepts are useful tools 
precisely because of their incompleteness and openness to new applications. A 
complete specification of the preconditions for the application of the “employ-
ee” concept in all relevant contexts is impossible. This element of indetermina-
cy is often seen as a problem, and in so far as it creates uncertainty in the prac-
tical operation of the law, it undoubtedly is. The converse of this lack of 
precision, however, is the mutability of the idea of the contract of employment 
and its potential for transformation. The legal form of the work relationship in 
English law has been reinvented several times over the past two centuries and 
the current model is an amalgam of several prototypes form an earlier periods; 
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other western European and North American legal systems have experienced a 
similar process. Legal concepts are anything but fixed. But how, more precisely 
have they managed to adapt to the changing economic and political contexts of 
industrial societies? 
3.  Legal Evolution: System, Convention and Norm 
Because they serve as a bridge between facts and norms, legal concepts are 
continuously open to empirical data. Nevertheless, the reception into the legal 
system of data from the social realm beyond the legal text involves a process of 
translation. This insight, which is at the core of the systemic view of law asso-
ciated with Niklas Luhmann (1984, 1993) and Gunther Teubner (1989) is often 
understood as generating a theory of “closed systems,” which is indeed one of 
the aspects most stressed by its authors. However, autopoiesis, or self-
reference, is only one part of the theory; the other is the capacity of systems to 
evolve by reference to their environment. The legal system is simultaneously 
closed and open, that is closed at the level of its internal operation, which con-
sists of recursive self-reference, but open at the level of its co-evolution with 
and adjustment to other social sub-systems. 
The ontology of systems theory is both naturalistic and constructionist (on 
these categories, see Searle 1995, 2010; Lawson 2014). It is naturalistic in so 
far as it conceives of the social realm as a context governed by “laws” in the 
descriptive sense, that is, regularities, which are consistent with the laws gov-
erning living forms in the natural realm. The social realm is a subset of the 
natural one; there can be no society, no realm defined by human interaction, 
without the existence of human beings who are, first and foremost, physical 
entities, that is to say, psychic or biological systems in their own right. The 
“laws of form” which determine the structure of living systems have their 
equivalent in regularities which frame the structure of society. The task of the 
human and social sciences, in identifying and unravelling these regularities, is 
no more or less “scientific” than the project of natural science disciplines such 
as molecular biology or population genetics. In both cases, there is an external 
“world” to be mapped and analysed using relevant techniques of inquiry.  
However, the social realm is not reducible to the natural one. The working 
hypothesis of systems theory is that the societal “laws of form” bear a family 
resemblance to, but are not identical with, those found in the natural realm. 
Biological concepts, such as self-reference, inheritance, mutation, and so on, 
are useful starting points for the theory of social systems, but are not unaffected 
by the process of their application to societal data. This is perhaps the problem 
with the idea of the “meme,” which has been proposed as a fundamental unit of 
cultural selection by analogy with the gene in natural selection. There is noth-
ing wrong in principle with the idea of drawing analogies from the natural 
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sciences for the purposes of theorizing the human and social ones, but propo-
nents of the meme are looking in the wrong place when they associate the 
meme with psychic or neurological systems. If genes have their equivalents in 
the cultural sphere, they are to be found at the level of phenomena such as 
conventions, institutions and norms which express elements of a distinctively 
social structure (Deakin 2003). 
According to the theory of social systems, if the natural realm consists of 
“matter” in the form of quarks, atoms, genes, proteins, and so on, the social 
realm consists of “communication.” To put it this way seems deeply counter-
intuitive; does society not consist at least of individuals and possibly, through 
their mutual interaction, of enduring institutions? Of course, “communication” 
cannot exist without human beings to do it, and it is their behaviour which 
constitutes “communicative action.” However, the two sets “communication” 
and “behaviour” are not identical. There are aspects of human behaviour which 
are rooted in physical, for example genetic causes, and there are aspects which 
are social in origin. It is the study of the specifically communicative dimension 
of human behaviour with which the social sciences are concerned. This is an 
important methodological move as it helps the social sciences to avoid the 
excessively reductive strategies of fields such as “sociobiology” and “neuroe-
conomics,” which attempt to offer all-encompassing naturalistic explanations 
for societal phenomena. Systems theory can perfectly well accommodate the 
existence of a natural, biological substrate to society, while proceeding on the 
basis that social structures have emerged out of, and hence are distinct from, 
that material base.  
Conversely, communication can take non-behavioural forms. Data can be 
communicated through human speech and through non-verbal behaviour, but 
they can also be embedded in physical objects (such as a traffic light or a bank-
note) and in texts (such as legal judgments and statutes). Complex texts “script-
code” behavioural regularities (Deakin and Carvalho 2011). These texts are not 
free-standing; they would not exist were there no human beings to make them, 
whether directly or at one remove through technologies of various kinds. How-
ever, organized texts, such as those of the legal system, display features which 
are not reducible to the psychic or behavioural strategies of the human beings 
who are their authors. In particular, texts have their own laws of form, that is, 
their own evolutionary tendencies. This entails a second important methodolog-
ical move: systems theory invites us to study both behaviour and text, “the 
world” and “the word,” and the links between them, in an evolutionary, that is 
to say, historical, perspective. 
It follows that the social reality assumed by systems theory is a “construct-
ed” one: it is the result of multiple discursive practices, each of which is self-
reproducing, and which are constantly coevolving by reference to one another. 
The view of the social world constructed through legal discourse is distinct 
from the perspective of the economic or political system. A term such as “con-
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tract” acquires its legal meaning from the place of contract within the taxonom-
ical structures of juridical thought, which are unique to legal reasoning. There 
is no precise match with the same term in economic discourse or in everyday 
language. Furthermore, there is no single, overriding social category of “con-
tract” to which the different discursive practices of the separate social systems 
have to conform or from which they can be said to originate. There are only 
multiple, overlapping and continuously mutating discursive forms. 
It does not follow from the communicative nature of social reality that there 
is no external world beyond the text. The text is the social world, but, im-
portantly, only one part of it. Thus the study of linguistic structures, their pre-
suppositions and commitments is one aspect, but only one, of social science 
method. Communicative data is embedded in texts, but also in routines, con-
ventions and norms which operate at the intersection of language and behav-
iour, and in physical objects which perform a communicative function. 
Nor does the “closure” of the various social sub-systems carry the implica-
tion that there are no points of correspondence between them. Legal concepts 
are separated from other dimensions of the social realm by the autopoietic 
closure of the legal system at the point of its self-reproduction. Legal concepts 
refer to other concepts, legal rules to other rules, and so on. This is a feature of 
law’s autonomy, of the neutral “rule of law” which is a core feature of modern 
liberal-democratic polities. But this “operational closure” is counterbalanced by 
the system’s “cognitive openness,” that is, its capacity to absorb signals from 
its external environment and to translate them into the terms of its own opera-
tion. Put more concretely, concepts in the legal system will be more or less 
successfully aligned with their referents in the economic realm, for example, to 
the extent that they can translate the transactional logic of economic relations 
into terms present in juridical language. 
It is this tension between openness and closure which drives legal evolution. 
This process can be understood through the operation of a “variation, selection, 
retention” algorithm which has points of correspondence with the same process 
in the evolution of living systems. On the one hand, conceptual categories, 
expressed through taxonomies which are often quite rigid and unbending, pro-
vide the skeleton frame or infrastructure which prevents the mass of individu-
ated norms dissolving into chaos. In evolutionary terms, they provide the basis 
for the “retention” or “inheritance” of forms which has its biological equivalent 
in the inter-generational transmission of genetic structures. On the other, con-
cepts provide the gateway for empirical data to enter the legal system. They 
condense or code information about the social realm beyond the text, in such a 
way that makes it possible for these empirical data to influence the content of 
legal rules. In this way, mutation or variation of legal rules is possible. Selec-
tion of rules, reflecting pressures from the external environment for rules which 
are more or less functional in given social settings, is internalized through the 
same distinct forms of juridical reasoning: legal rules persist not simply be-
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cause they “fit” with external environment parameters, but according to how 
far they operate consistently with the internal categories of legal analysis. 
It follows that we should not expect legal evolution to produce rules which 
are optimal for a given set of external economic or political conditions. The law 
cannot be completely open to its environment, since that would imply the dissolu-
tion of the system itself. While the preservation of a self-reproducing system 
might not seem to offer any advantage to society in terms of its broader function-
ality or fitness, the point is that a social world without such boundaries would be 
informationally impoverished. The autonomy of the legal system is the functional 
precondition for the preservation of the applied information (“knowledge”) em-
bedded in it. This information is useful, possibly essential, for achieving social 
coordination in an otherwise endlessly uncertain and contingent world.  
But it is also clear that the legal system can be expected both to respond at 
some level to changes in its context, and to initiate them. The law, then, is 
partially endogenous to economic and political change. It can be both the inde-
pendent and the dependent variable. On the one hand, regularities which begin 
in a transactional or organizational context can find their way into the legal 
system. Conventions which are based on shared knowledge among a popula-
tion of actors can emerge on the basis of repeated interactions between them 
(Lewis 1969). The law may adopt the content of conventions: “general clauses” 
in contract law provide a portal for commercial practice to enter legal discourse 
(Teubner 1989). Conversely, the law may seek to trigger social change by alter-
ing the basis of conventional behaviour. The phenomena of “information cas-
cades” (Bikchandani et al. 1992) and “bargaining in the shadow of the law” 
(Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979) are examples of this type of interaction between 
laws and conventions. Social norms may impart a sense of duty or obligation 
independently of the presence of legal sanctions, but their successful operation 
frequently depends on the possibility of legal sanctions being available, for ex-
ample at the apex of a “pyramid of enforcement” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). 
This type of “responsive” or “reflexive” law can be conjoined with private order-
ing without losing its unique public-regulatory character. 
4.  Case Study: The Coevolution of Labour Market 
Conventions and Legal Norms in Western Europe 
In the early nineteenth century, juridical forms underwent a rapid evolution in 
response to the rise of waged labour and the decline of guild forms of work 
organization. In the civilian systems of France and Germany, the process was 
marked by the assimilation of the work relationship to the contractual catego-
ries set out in the civil codes. The drafters of the Code Civil of 1804 adapted 
the Roman law concept of the hire of work or locatio conductio to indicate the 
consensual nature of the wage-work bargain, in contrast to status-based catego-
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ries associated with pre-revolutionary law. The term Arbeitskraft or “labour 
power,” which identified the sale of the capacity to work as the essence of the 
transaction between worker and employer, owed its origins to juridical debates 
in Germany in this period, prior to its use in Marx’s political economy writings 
of the 1840s (Simitis 2000). 
The Code Civil adopted a binary definition of the work relationship, accord-
ing to which the Roman law concept of the locatio conductio operarum was 
mapped on to the category of the louage de services (“hire of labour services”) 
and the locatio conductio operis aligned with the louge d’ouvrage (“hire of 
completed work”). The German civil code of 1896, the Bürgerliches Ge-
setzbuch, drawing on earlier German codes which themselves borrowed from 
the Code civil, adopted a similar distinction between the Dienstvertrag (“con-
tract for service”) and Werkvertrag (“contract for work”). In the English com-
mon law of the nineteenth century, apparently the same classification can be 
found between servants employed under a “contract of service” and independ-
ent contractors working under a “contract for services.” 
These distinctions appear at first sight to correspond to the modern division, 
found in all contemporary labour law systems in some form or another, be-
tween employees in a relationship of subordination to an employer, on the one 
hand, and self-employed or independent workers, on the other. The Roman law 
origin of the distinction between the two forms of the locatio gives the impres-
sion that this division, along with the different market-based versions of the 
wage-labour relationship to which it appears to correspond, is of very long, 
indeed ancient, standing. However, a number of historical and comparative 
studies have shown that this impression is misleading (Veneziani 1986; Supiot 
1995; Mansfield, Salais and Whiteside 1994; Deakin 1996, 2001; Simitis 2000; 
Mückenberger and Supiot 2000; Cottereau 2000, 2002; Didry 2002; Sims 
2002; Petit and Sauze 2004; Le Roux 2009). Although the classifications 
adopted in the nineteenth century share some of the same terminology as those 
used in Roman law and also in today’s legal categories, the various classifica-
tory schemes performed entirely different functions for the labour markets of 
their day. There were also significant cross-national differences, so that appar-
ently identical terms (allowing for translation) had distinct roles according to 
their use in a given legal system. 
The use of the Roman categories of the locatio in the Code Civil was nomi-
nal only (Veneziani 1986). Their use was primarily ideological; it was intended 
to convey the sense that work relations under the new code would be character-
ized by formal contractual equality. Around the same time as the adoption of 
the Code, however, the French legislature had adopted a set of regulatory laws 
which envisaged the work relationship as a hierarchical one, the essence of 
which was the worker’s subjection to the power of the employer. The Loi ger-
minal of 1803 imposed criminal sanctions on organizations of workers 
(ouvriers) and instituted the livret or workbook system to control labour mobil-
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ity (Cottereau 2002). In this way, the same work relationship could be charac-
terized in two completely different ways by the same legal system: one based 
on freedom of contract and exchange of commodities, the other reinventing 
status relations in a new, disciplinary form. 
The same mingling of legal forms is visible in English law of the same peri-
od. On the one hand, the relationship of “master and servant” was a contractual 
one, constituted by an exchange of promises. On the other, the status of servant 
was defined by legislation which made it a criminal offence, punishable by 
fines or imprisonment, for the servant to commit an act of indiscipline or quit 
work without giving the agreed notice. “Servants” in this specific statutory 
sense were not domestic workers (they occupied a separate, non-statutory cate-
gory), but waged workers in a range of specific agricultural and manufacturing 
trades. These laws were strengthened and made more punitive in the period of 
the transition to a largely industrial economy in the century after 1750 (Hay 
and Craven 2004; Deakin and Wilkinson 2005).  
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, “employees” were higher sta-
tus workers outside the personal scope of the master-servant laws, such as 
journalists, teachers and managers of industrial enterprises. Thus at this point, 
the terms “servant” and “employee” described two different types of waged or 
salaried workers (Deakin 2001). The association of the term “employee” with 
all categories of wage or salary-dependent work was a much later development. 
A similar adaptation of forms is visible in both French and German law. Wage-
dependent workers could be found on either side of the formal divide between 
the louage d’ouvrage and the louage de services (Petit and Sauze 2004), while 
the Dienstvertrag concept covered both wage-dependent workers and inde-
pendent contractors (Sims 2002) at the end of the nineteenth century. 
The fragmentation and conceptual fluidity of labour laws at this point re-
flects industrial societies which were still in the process of formation. Although 
wage labour was becoming more common in all systems, there were wide 
variations at industry level and across countries in the way labour was contract-
ed. A direct employment nexus between the worker and the employing enter-
prise was unusual in many British manufacturing sectors as late as the early 
twentieth century. Instead, it was normal for labour to be supplied indirectly 
through contractors or intermediaries. In Germany and France, direct employ-
ment became the norm at an earlier stage (Biernacki 1995; Didry 2002).  
The appearance of the “contract of employment” as a juridical form can be 
traced to the period when vertical integration of production in industrial enter-
prises became well established. In France and Germany this was at the end of 
the nineteenth century but in Britain the legal watershed came later, in the 
middle decades of the twentieth century (Deakin 2006). A second factor in the 
emergence of the contract of employment was the development of mechanisms 
for worker protection, in the form of collective bargaining, workplace health 
and safety legislation, and social insurance (Mansfield et al. 1994; Didry 2002). 
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In France, the term contrat du travail was first used in the 1880s to describe 
work relationships regulated by the social legislation of that time (Cottereau 
2002). The adoption of this new model in place of forms based on the locatio 
had a dual significance: for employers it formalized their powers of unilateral 
direction and control, while for trade unions it was an indication of the increas-
ing regularization and stabilization of wage labour. In Germany, the emergence 
of the Arbeitsvertrag is associated with the social legislation of the Weimar 
Republic. In Britain, the 1870s saw the removal of criminal sanctions against 
workers and the mutation of the “servant” into the “workman” in the context of 
workmen’s compensation legislation. However, it was not until post-1945 
reforms to social insurance and employment protection law that the formerly 
distinct concepts of “servant,” “workman” and “employee” were fused into the 
single category of the “contract of employment” (Deakin 1996). 
A conceptual case study such as this suggests a number of things. The first 
is that concepts are mutable. They adjust to changes in the economic and politi-
cal environment of the law. The mutations which gave rise to the emergence of 
the employment contract as the core concept of modern labour law systems 
took place against the backdrop of changes in organizational practices, which 
saw the rise of the vertically integrated industrial enterprise, and the related 
growth of worker self-organization through trade unions. Ideology and politics 
also played a role, as the influence of working class political parties, itself the 
result of the extension of the democratic franchise, was reflected in the adop-
tion of workmen’s compensation and social insurance legislation. Changes in 
the taxonomical structure of labour law reflected these changes (Deakin 2006).  
A second point is that concepts are multi-functional. The developed form of 
the contract of employment in advanced industrial societies performs two dis-
tinct tasks: on the one hand it provides a legal form for the exercise of manage-
rial power within the framework of the enterprise while, on the other, it pro-
vides the worker with access to insurance against labour market risks and the 
right to organize (Deakin 2001). In a more internal, juridical sense, the em-
ployment contract is both a source of regulatory norms for the employment 
relationship, and a basis for the classification of different forms of wage labour. 
A third point is that concepts are transferable across different contexts. In 
English law, the concept of the “servant” which was used in the context of the 
disciplinary master-servant law of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries was later adopted in the context of worker-protective health and safe-
ty laws, while the notion of the “employee,” which initially described “high-
status” work relationships characterized by a certain degree of professional 
autonomy for the worker, later came to describe all wage-dependent work 
relationships. Thus concepts can alter their function, and underpin rules of very 
different types, while retaining their basic form (Deakin 2001). 
A fourth point is that conceptual change is path-dependent. The law displays 
a high degree of conceptual continuity, even or perhaps especially at the point 
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where a significant mutation occurs. The retrieval of the ancient Roman law 
form of the locatio in the civilian codes of the nineteenth century is just one of 
the more extreme examples of this tendency (Veneziani 1986). At the end of 
the same century, the novelty of the idea of the contrat de travail was masked 
by attempts to show that it was the descendant of the louage d’ouvrage (Cot-
tereau 2002). The process which saw the “servant” evolve into the “workman” 
and then the “employee” in English law is another example of the tendency to 
invoke the past in order to justify innovation. This tendency is not without its 
costs: present taxonomies are never entirely free of the effects of past classifi-
cations, including the normative connotations they carry with them. Thus the 
preservation of elements of the “servant” concept in the modern English com-
mon law played a part in delaying the courts’ acceptance of norms of mutual 
trust and confidence as the core of the contract of employment (Brodie 1996).  
5.  The Ontological Status of Legal Forms 
We are now in a position to return to the question we posed at the outset: what 
is the ontological status of juridical concepts? The systemic-evolutionary view 
of the legal system presented in this article is consistent with a view of social 
reality as constituted by the collective practices, including behavioural regulari-
ties, conventions and social norms, but also more formally structured institu-
tions such as the legal system, which make it possible for individuals to coordi-
nate their actions. It is because such practices are, to a greater or lesser degree, 
effective in achieving societal coordination that, as Tony Lawson puts it, “their 
reality is established,” and because they are “irreducible to the individuals” 
which they organize that it is possible to envisage a distinctive domain of the 
social and human sciences devoted to their study (Lawson 2014).  
There are three specific ways in which legal concepts operate as distinct el-
ements within social structure.  
The first relates to the domain-specific operation of the legal system. The 
idea that abstract concepts might determine the content of legal rules, and 
thereby shape the outcomes of legal acts such as adjudication and legislation, 
has had many detractors. The idea that legal form, to the exclusion of policy or 
ideology on the one hand or economic circumstances on the other, is responsi-
ble for the substance of legal rules in a contested field such as labour law, is 
indeed a difficult proposition to defend. However, a completely defensible 
proposition is that legal concepts shape the path of the law and so at least par-
tially influence the content of legal rules. The conceptual architecture of juridi-
cal thought both facilitates and constrains legislation intended to give effect to 
social and economic policy.  
Juridical forms are not, however, limited to their place within legal reason-
ing. Thus a second dimension to their operation relates to the role they play in 
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constituting social relationships beyond the legal system. The cognitive open-
ness of social systems implies the possibility (indeed, high likelihood) that the 
consequences of juridical forms are felt at the level of the psychic and material 
conditions of human life. For the individual whose work relationship is classi-
fied as an “employee” some very tangible consequences will follow for their 
fiscal status and financial position. The interpenetration of juridical categories 
with social life is not confined, though, to those relations or transactions imme-
diately affected by determinations of state officials. Through numerous effects 
including “bargaining in the shadow the law,” social relations are constituted 
and reconstituted by legal norms, to the extent that the coercive power of legal 
sanctions may remain more or less hidden from view.  
This suggests a third aspect of legal forms, which is that they have a causal 
influence over the evolution of social structure. Law can be a causal as well as 
an outcome variable. This does not mean that the use of the law to bring about 
social change is straightforward. The success of legal techniques will often 
depend on how far legal norms can be aligned with or matched to collective 
practices beyond the legal system. Relatedly, the ability of the legal system to 
absorb and process information from other social systems will determine its 
effectiveness as an instrument of policy. The capacity of concepts to receive 
data from the external world while retaining the unity and coherence of taxo-
nomical forms is directly in point here. 
If legal forms have these constitutive and causal roles, what does this imply 
for our understanding of social structure more generally? As the examples 
given earlier show, legal texts are themselves a source of knowledge about the 
social world, particularly when they are studied in an historical perspective. 
This does not mean that that we can read off, from the existence of a legal 
concept, the existence of a corresponding entity in the external world. The 
drafter’s choice of a particular concept to frame a given statutory rule, such as 
“servant” or “employee,” is not made on the basis of an empirical observation 
of the social realm. Nor does the attribution by a judge of a term such as “em-
ployee,” to a particular set of preconditions for the application of a norm, in 
and of itself create a given social reality beyond the legal system. Yet both acts 
– the definition of a juridical concept and its application to a given factual 
context – presuppose at least a certain degree of connection between legal 
forms and the wider social reality of which they form a part. The set of juridical 
forms available to the drafter is framed by the long and complex process of 
coevolution which up to that point has shaped the relationship between the 
legal and economic systems. In the same way, the application of a legal con-
cept to a given social or economic context is inevitably framed by the need for 
some level of effectiveness in the translation of norms into action. To observe a 
legal system in operation is to see part of the process by which a unique social 
reality, of which the law is a part, is brought into being.  
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